




Taking Liberties: Academic 
Freedom and the Humanities
\ /
Doug StewarD
It is absolutely essential that the learned community at the university . . .  
contain a faculty that is independent of the government’s command with re-
gard to its teachings; one that, having no commands to give, is free to evaluate 
everything, and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, that is, with 
truth: one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly. For without a 
faculty of this kind, the truth would not come to light (and this would be to 
the government’s own detriment); but reason is by its nature free and admits 
of no command to hold something as true (no imperative “Believe!” but only 
a free “I believe”).
—Immanuel Kant
The Western history of academic freedom begins with Plato’s account of 
the trial of Socrates, who was executed after spurious charges of his teach-
ing’s impiety and corruption of youth scandalized his fellow citizens. More 
recently, in 1951, William F. Buckley played Meletus to what he called 
“academic freedomites” (146) in God and Man at Yale: The Superstitions of 
“Academic Freedom.” Buckley hailed the 1950s as an era of consumer rule in 
higher education, asserting that trustees and alumni have not only the right 
but “the duty to ‘interfere’ ” when a university does not urge pro-capitalist, 
pro-Christian viewpoints on students (115). University faculty members 
would necessarily comply since, as Buckley put it, “every citizen in a free 
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economy, no matter the wares that he plies, must defer to the sovereignty 
of the consumer” (185). Elaborating on this view, John Chamberlain wrote, 
“in a democracy, the customer (who pays the bills) must have the right to 
exercise his free choice when he is out shopping in the market place. The 
autonomy of the customer should hold whether he is buying toothpaste, 
tennis rackets—or education for his children” (emphasis added). This con-
sumerist attitude did not originate in the 1950s: Kant mocked something 
like it in 1784 when he wrote, “I need not think, so long as I can pay” (“An 
Answer” 54). Buckley considered it morally incumbent on the trustees of 
Yale to direct the economics faculty to promote individualism and free 
markets, which faculty members’ expertise in economics apparently left 
them reluctant to do voluntarily. He was also displeased by what he con-
sidered the lewd content of some courses and by an ambient irreverence 
toward religion. In short, he objected to the Yale faculty’s impiety and cor-
ruption of youth and promoted a moralizing view of education as a com-
modity subject to the sovereignty of consumer whim, a view that has taken 
root in public discourse in the intervening years. The view is more than 
half a century old, its roots stretching back well before the culture wars 
of the 1980s; the feminist, gay, and Chicano/a movements of the 1970s; 
and the black civil rights movement of the 1960s—moments when certain 
myopic commentators would have us believe that politics illicitly entered 
higher education through the machinations of one disruptive minority or 
another. Sweepingly, we might ask, with Jacques Derrida, “has impiety not 
always been, and thus still is today, the principal and surest charge against 
any disquieting thinker?” (Du droit 46; my trans.).
Prevarications of the Unfreedomites
After decades of development by a network of funding agencies, think tanks, 
and activist organizations, consumerist rhetoric is now taken for granted 
even at the highest levels of government. In a recent interview, Margaret 
Spellings—the United States Secretary of Education, whose daughter at-
tends Davidson College—referred to herself, off-handedly, as a concerned 
“customer of a private college” (“Time”). This customer-service mental-
ity’s failure to distinguish a substantive difference between purchasing 
toothpaste at a drugstore and paying tuition to a college is troubling. The 
implication in Spellings’s and Chamberlain’s view that they, rather than 
the students, are the ones being served is unfortunate and symptomatic of 
class-specific assumptions about money and tuition: my money buys my 
child the commodity of my class legacy.
Combined with a moralizing political agenda, such as Buckley’s, some 




versions of educational consumerism are ominous. Riled by allegations of 
impiety and corruption of youth, in March 2006 Arizona legislators put 
forward a bill that would have required professors at state institutions to 
provide alternative assignments for students who were offended by content 
in course materials. Linda Gray (Republican, Phoenix), chair of the Arizona 
senate’s Higher Education Committee, declared, “[Professors] contrib-
ute to society accepting immoral behavior.” Considering Gray’s position 
on the Higher Education Committee, this is a startling judgment. “(The 
classroom) is where they get to the mind,” she warned (qtd. in Cronin). 
This bill is only one of many recently inspired by David Horowitz’s so-
called Academic Bill of Rights, which purports to ensure ideological bal-
ance on university faculties by stripping the faculty of the right to choose 
whom to hire based solely on the person’s professional qualifications and 
the institution’s educational goals. Not always articulated in explicitly con-
sumerist terms, this profoundly anti-intellectual politicization of faculty 
hiring typifies attempts to immolate academic freedom in its own name: 
by declaring the importance of ensuring an Orwellian “intellectual diver-
sity” even at the cost of the faculty’s expert self-determination.
In their worst forms, such anti-intellectual movements seek not merely 
to exercise the right to critique how universities run their affairs but to 
put the stopper on controversial scholarship and teaching, to defund the 
institutions sheltering controversial professors, and to institute a kind of 
academic unfreedom closely monitored by trustees, governors, alumni, 
legislators, parents, and affluent think tanks with well-defined agendas. 
Founded by Lynne Cheney, among others, the American Council of 
Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) is an especially menacing antifaculty activist 
organization that has received more than $2 million in grants in the past 
eight or nine years from such right-wing agencies as the Sarah Scaife, the 
Earhart, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundations (Media Transpar-
ency). ACTA takes special interest in the “interpretive” fields of the human-
ities and social sciences and hastened to profit politically from the attacks 
on 9/11, publishing an inflammatory pamphlet, Defending Civilization: How 
Our Universities Are Failing America and What Can Be Done about It, on its 
Web site only two months after the terrorist strikes. In that pamphlet, 
ACTA’s principal employees, Jerry Martin and Anne Neal, applauded 
United States military action on the basis of the general public’s anger 
and patriotism immediately following 9/11 (1)—not on the basis of military 
strategy or intelligence community recommendation—and impugned the 
reputation and character of any professor who wondered aloud about the 
hijackers’ motives, discussed critically the history of United States foreign 




policy in the Middle East or Latin America, encouraged the study of Islam, 
or distinguished between proximate and ultimate causes. Throughout the 
pamphlet, debate on terrorism and 9/11 is cast in the crude terms of those 
who support the president and oppose terrorism and those who oppose 
the president and support terrorism, those who “[call] evil by its rightful 
name” and those who “BLAME AMERICA FIRST” (1, 3). Defending Civi-
lization is essentially a compilation of professors’ (sometimes intemperate) 
remarks taken out of context and as such was widely understood to be 
a kind of blacklist. The pamphlet prompted Senator Joseph Lieberman 
to write to ACTA to object to it and its unauthorized insinuation of his 
support and to ask that his name be removed from ACTA’s Web site as 
a cofounder. The council then added an acknowledgment that no public 
figure, including Lynne Cheney and Lieberman, “had endorsed or been 
asked to endorse” the pamphlet. This devious maneuver allowed the coun-
cil to maintain its pretense of bipartisanship, appeared to lift the pamphlet 
above the fray of politics, and concealed the fact that Lieberman had ex-
plicitly denounced it.
ACTA has never said anything about the innumerable xenophobic re-
sponses to 9/11, but in a series of documents stretching back a decade, such 
as The Shakespeare File (Martin, Neal, and Nadel), it has argued that the fac-
ulty has forfeited its right to academic freedom because of its moral relativ-
ism, classroom politicking, and low standards and because it has eschewed 
the concomitant responsibilities, principally respect for the political views 
of right-wing students when they differ from professors’. For their part, 
literature professors are allegedly teaching everything but literature (Mar-
tin, Neal, and Nadel 8–9; ACTA, How Many 7). ACTA never establishes 
that faculty members do not teach (classic) literature, only that they often 
have recourse to fields other than literature in their teaching. Literature 
has not been removed from language and literature curricula, but most 
folks nowadays do consider formalist criticism only one set of tools and 
agree with Theodor Adorno’s view that “if you attempt to understand a 
thing purely on its own terms, then you will understand nothing” (13). 
As a result, the study of literature and its contexts is broadly conceived, 
often in interdisciplinary ways.
In fact, interdisciplinary work and ethnic studies in particular figure 
importantly in ACTA’s latest salvo, provocatively titled How Many Ward 
Churchills?, which is again largely a compilation of quotations with mini-
mal exposition of argument. The title’s question is rhetorical and leads to 
the further rhetorical questions, “Do professors in their classrooms ensure 
a robust exchange of ideas designed to help students to think for them-




selves? Or do they use their classrooms as platforms for propaganda, sites 
of sensitivity training, and launching pads for political activism?” (fore-
word). ACTA President Anne Neal is promptly quoted assuring us that 
she supports academic freedom but intoning that it ends where profes-
sors “abuse the special trust they are given to respect students’ academic 
freedom to learn.” Even as ACTA admits that “Churchill has followed an 
exceptional path to academic prominence,” it claims that “he is not at all 
unusual,” stating explicitly that he represents faculty members’ political 
radicalism, especially where 9/11 is concerned. More subtly, ACTA’s logic 
of guilt by association suggests Churchill represents faculty members’ 
lack of rigor, since his scholarship was under investigation by an ad hoc 
committee. The pamphlet pretends to tell us what professors are doing 
in classrooms, but there is no evidence that anyone from ACTA visited a 
single classroom in preparing the hefty pamphlet, which relies exclusively 
on material available on the Internet, such as course descriptions.
I’ll only highlight a couple of telltale moments in How Many Ward 
Churchills? (There is so much so fundamentally wrong with ACTA’s pam-
phlets that one must take them sentence by sentence.) Let me underscore 
at the outset that this pamphlet connects Churchill’s exceptionally ill- 
considered comments on 9/11 to all manner of academic study that has no 
connection whatsoever to 9/11. ACTA begins with a number of courses 
that treat questions of race and ethnicity, taking these as the exemplary 
evil of what it calls “the politicized liberal arts curriculum” (6). In a sense, 
the tract is an objective description: although it takes a sententious, pa-
tronizing tone and imputes traitorous motives to professors, ACTA does 
not seem to distort the actual course descriptions it cherry-picks from the 
Web. Instead, it operates by unarticulated argument, as when it declares 
of several courses on race and ethnicity, “The rationale for such courses 
stems from the belief that it is the professor’s job to challenge students’ 
unexamined assumptions” (6). In context, this observation is meant, prima 
facie, to horripilate readers who never suspected such perfidy in an Ameri-
can classroom. But in fact it is the professor’s job to challenge students’ un-
examined assumptions—especially on questions of particular obfuscation 
in the arena of popular opinion, such as race. Questioning unexamined 
assumptions has been the professor’s job since ancient Greece; it epito-
mizes the Socratic method. As Gary Pavela concisely explains, students’ 
own academic freedom is embedded within the maieutic practice:
[A teacher] asserts a belief or hypothesis to invite refutation. The teacher 
may have superior knowledge and experience but encourages students 
to raise doubts and fresh perspectives to define truth anew—a method 




rooted in a synthesis of free inquiry and collaboration that could be re-
garded as the beginning of the scientific method.
The general model of learning as dialogue is the dominant one today in 
many disciplines, having replaced the lecture from on high some time ago. 
ACTA pretends to defend the Western tradition. Instead, it is not only ig-
norant of the most basic and ancient pedagogical practice of that tradition 
but actually gets pedagogy dead wrong and thus misrepresents courses on 
race and ethnicity.
Another example involving race and ethnicity, this time in reference to 
a course on the Third World and the West at Duke University, further il-
lustrates ACTA’s mode of argument by association. Of the course ACTA’s 
concluding sentence remarks, “Assigned texts include Ward Churchill’s A 
Little Matter of Genocide—a book whose claims about the U.S. Army’s treat-
ment of Native Americans are implicated in the University of Colorado’s 
investigation of whether Churchill has committed academic fraud” (How 
Many 6). This rhetorical legerdemain epitomizes the insinuation of guilt 
that ACTA specializes in. Although Churchill’s scholarship was at the time 
under review, ACTA, without (to all appearances) picking up a single one 
of his books, not to mention having no one on staff with expertise in Na-
tive studies, effectively renders judgment on Churchill’s work. At the same 
time, without committing itself to any positive statement, ACTA implies 
that a course with Churchill on the syllabus is by definition a bad course 
and—most remarkably—that the United States Army probably treated 
Native Americans just fine (since Churchill, who asserted otherwise, was 
under investigation for academic fraud . . .). In terms of evidence this argu-
ment by insinuation is null, but it is efficient sophistry nonetheless.
Like Horowitz, ACTA sometimes declares its position to be politically 
neutral; at other times, it promotes “intellectual diversity,” which means 
conservative professors who teach from a conservative viewpoint. ACTA 
never says which conservative courses would provide for intellectual di-
versity; it only fingers the courses that it finds objectionably uniform in 
their leftist slant. But we do know exactly what those courses “homoge-
neously” opposed—social injustice, domestic violence, monolingualism, 
white power, jingoism, xenophobia, male supremacy, slavery, racism, pov-
erty, homophobia, misogyny, orientalism, genocide, spread-eagle foreign 
policy, and Third World exploitation. (ACTA examined only the humani-
ties and social sciences, the disciplines most likely to be concerned with 
human rights and wrongs. The natural sciences, not to mention schools of 
business, engineering, medicine, and so on, are wholly absent.) Here too 
ACTA follows the example of Buckley, who came very close to condemning 




Yale for not employing any professors with “anti-Semitic, anti-negroid 
prejudices” who would espouse “the anthropological superiority of the 
Aryan,” since these were “value-judgments . . . upheld by various scholars 
not only in the past but in the present day [1951] as well” (148). Buckley 
and ACTA reproach humanists for their moral relativism, but what they 
mean is that they don’t approve of humanists’ moral vision. Indeed, it is not 
nihilistic moral relativism to take well-reasoned positions on questions of 
human rights and responsibilities, as professors routinely do; it is nihilistic 
moral relativism, or something worse, to insinuate that Native Americans 
were treated well by the United States Army or that Aryanism might legiti-
mately counterbalance antiracism in college curricula since both are “value- 
judgments.” Such is the pedigree of today’s push for intellectual diversity.
It will not do to allow insinuation and appeals to prejudice to govern 
public debate on higher education. Opponents of academic freedom spe-
cialize in the prevaricating attack, and their reluctance to advocate for any-
thing more specific than lots of Shakespeare instead of what they attack is 
a weakness in their assault on the faculty’s autonomy. At every opportunity, 
such critics should be asked to specify the details of their preferred edu-
cational program or to specify points on which they dispute a particular 
work of scholarship. Likewise where they imply that racial and ethnic dis-
crimination no longer exists, or never existed, they should be confronted 
with evidence to the contrary and required to respond to it. Such crit-
ics’ ignorance or misrepresentation of the history of the university and of 
academic freedom should be highlighted. As Toni Morrison reminds us, 
the people have a right to expose “language that . . . tucks its fascist boots 
under crinolines of respectability and patriotism as it moves relentlessly 
toward the bottom line and the bottomed-out mind.”
We should also assert that professors in the humanities and social sci-
ences promote certain values over others in the classroom, when they do, 
because their professional expertise leads them to conclude that some val-
ues are not only less desirable but also destructive. These are not questions 
of mere opinion. Biologists oppose the imposition of “intelligent design” 
on their curricula because it does not meet relevant standards in biology, 
not because they are biased. Astronomers hire more astronomers, rather 
than astrologists, because they share hard-earned scholarly values with 
the former, not the latter. Intelligent design and astrology are beliefs, not 
science. Likewise, scholars in the humanities and social sciences do not 
promote, for example, the beliefs of racism in their courses, because their 
professional study of the subject matter, to which they dedicate their lives, 
has led them to conclude that racism is a set of human values and practices 
worthy of opposition and that students studying, say, The Tempest or La 




condition humaine need to know something about colonialism’s history in 
order to understand the meaning of those texts. Humanists, in particular, 
are trained to make complex judgments about human values and the hu-
man creations that give them form. That’s what humanists do, and the 
critique of “the human” itself is one of the most compelling avenues of 
contemporary thought.
I stress that ACTA plans to abolish existing due process for hiring and 
firing professors. To counter what it considers biased teaching—and taking 
another page from Buckley’s God and Man at Yale—ACTA promotes the 
hierarchical takeover of higher education faculties through strong, hands-
on lay governance by trustees; gubernatorial and legislative intervention; 
and strategized alumni giving that places strict limitations on how funds 
can be used, effectively installing donors as curriculum planners. These 
are not ACTA’s hypothetical remedies to be implemented only if the re-
forms that ACTA advocates are not undertaken through more traditional 
means. According to Neal’s think-tank mantra for state legislatures, strong 
lay governance is a sine qua non of higher education in a democracy, but 
Neal’s oft-repeated statement is false. Lay governance did not spring from 
the soil of democracy as such. The lay board of governance is a quirk of 
American higher education that arose not at all from democracy per se 
but from the necessity of denominationally affiliated institutions’ ability to 
survive in the United States’ religiously plural society: to temper sectarian 
dogmatism (Hofstadter 122–23). Ironically, ACTA’s promotion of strong 
lay governance by trustees is today designed to do the opposite: to govern 
by dogmatism. In doing so, ACTA would subordinate the systematic pur-
suit of truth and knowledge by thousands of highly trained and certified 
experts to the personal opinion of a tiny number of wealthy persons who 
are more likely to have a business background than an academic one and 
among whom women and people of color are grossly underrepresented 
(Fain). As Richard Hofstadter noted in the 1950s, the “system of lay gov-
ernment has created special problems for free teaching and scholarship 
in America” (120); it is a legacy that ACTA would like to see made even 
more problematic by urging trustees to exercise legal powers that they 
have never before routinely exercised.
It would be a mistake to play the ostrich, hoping all this poppycock will 
melt into air. It is tempting to think that organizations like ACTA are too 
extreme to be effective, and it is galling to grant their sophistry the legiti-
macy of a response. Unfortunately, they are politically effective. For in-
stance, many powerful friends and former colleagues of Cheney’s buttress 
ACTA. The former president of the University of Colorado, Hank Brown, 
helped found ACTA when it was known as the National Alumni Forum 




(McAllister; ACTA, “Alumni”). Brown became the university’s president 
when its previous president, Elizabeth Hoffman, was forced to resign, in 
good part because of the Churchill controversy that ACTA did so much 
to hystericize. ACTA’s current chairman, Jerry Martin, worked on Brown’s 
staff when he was a Republican senator from Colorado (Florida). A for-
mer chair of the philosophy department of the University of Colorado, 
Boulder, Martin also worked at the NEH when it was headed by Cheney 
(ACTA, “Jerry L. Martin”), who herself holds a master’s degree from the 
university and is chairman emeritus of ACTA’s National Council. Anne 
Neal, who holds a Harvard law degree, was general counsel to the NEH 
during Cheney’s tenure and has been appointed by the secretary of educa-
tion to the National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and In-
tegrity, the panel responsible for reviewing accrediting agencies (Wilson; 
Lederman). Like the former Colorado governor Dick Lamm, who is the 
National Council’s vice chairman, the current governor of Colorado, Bill 
Owens, is active in ACTA (McAllister). According to Emma Pérez, Owens 
hosted an ACTA conference for state trustees and appointed an ACTA co-
ordinator to the board of trustees for Mesa State College when the board 
was restructured. (ACTA invites appointing committees for trusteeships 
to consult them for the names of ACTA-approved nominees.) This is only 
what I happen to know about the accomplishments of ACTA, which is only 
one such right-wing agency, in only one of its target states. ACTA’s Web 
site lists accomplishments that it takes public credit for in other target 
states. The site includes a description of the Governor’s Project, in which 
the council notes that its most effective work is done in behind-the-scenes 
networking—exactly the way it has operated in Colorado. Besides Brown, 
ACTA claims special success with “Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore, Gov-
ernor George Pataki and Mayor Rudolph Giuliani . . . , and Florida Gov-
ernor Jeb Bush” (“Governor’s Project”).
ACTA is but one organization stumping for external control of higher 
education faculties. Funding for the National Association of Scholars 
(NAS) dwarfs ACTA’s and comes from the very same sources (Media Trans-
parency). In fact, NAS President Stephen Balch is also a director at ACTA, 
a fact that neither not-for-profit organization’s IRS Form 990 indicates on 
line 80, where one might expect to see it. In 2001 the Colorado Commis-
sion on Higher Education paid NAS $25,000 to review the University of 
Colorado’s education program. Drawing on NAS’s review, the commission 
voted to approve only eleven of the university’s fifty-five academic ma-
jors for elementary education students. The Colorado Springs Independent 
reported, “Some of the majors disallowed by the Commission included 
American studies, astronomy, chemistry, fine arts, geology, business, music, 




philosophy, political science, psychology, sociology, classics, religious stud-
ies, women’s studies, environmental studies, ethnic studies, Asian studies 
and all foreign languages” (Campbell). The NAS first made a name for it-
self in Texas in 1990, at the University of Texas, Austin, when it successfully 
blocked an English course on civil rights readings that had been proposed 
in response to increased incidents of racial and sexual harassment (People, 
Buying 15). Blocking one English course may not seem serious from one 
perspective; from another, this external interference was a grave breach of 
academic freedom.
Organizations like NAS and ACTA do not present well-reasoned argu-
ments backed by good evidence, but they don’t need to. Their objective 
is not to win a legitimate debate but to incite fear, muddy the water, and 
activate prejudice. At the end of the day, these objectives are adequate as 
long as their audience doesn’t have the critical-thinking skills that liberal 
arts programs should be teaching students. We need to know what kind of 
arguments groups like ACTA make, but it should not be educators’ goal to 
rebut ACTA itself (or Horowitz, the NAS, etc.). Instead, our goal should 
be to persuade various publics of the nullity of ACTA’s arguments and to 
suffuse classrooms, campuses, and local and national media and legisla-
tures with a deep understanding of traditional academic freedom’s value 
to professors, students, and society and of the ways in which our curricula 
produce literate and culturally sophisticated graduates who contribute not 
only to the labor force but also to the nation’s enjoyment and livability, its 
cultural life and vitality. It is especially critical that we articulate the value 
of academic freedom for students. Professors might include in their syl-
labi a statement on academic freedom—perhaps their university’s official 
statement or that of the Global Colloquium of University Presidents—
and discuss it in class so that students understand how academic freedom 
assures them the best education professors can provide them with. It is a 
violation of all students’ academic freedom to coerce professors to down-
grade course work to appease philistine political interests, even if the coer-
cion originates from the transient discomfort of an individual student who, 
for whatever reason, objects to course work. Individual students do not 
have a right to be free from discomfiture in the classroom; all students do 
have a right to professors’ best educational judgment. Students with objec-
tions are perfectly free to enter grievance procedures or, on the consumer-
choice model they may prefer, to buy a degree from a for-profit institution 
that will cater to their whims.
Students are key to the current debate over academic freedom, for to-
day’s opponents of academic freedom take a theological view of Ameri-
can patriotism, fearing that students will be led to doubt by professors’ 




questions about the Western tradition and United States history. Such 
opponents play to parents’ fear that their children will be corrupted or 
otherwise hurt and, to protect patriotic orthodoxy, do not scruple to make 
the most frenzied charges they can work themselves up to in the hope that 
some little bit of the mud thus slung will stick. In an introductory seg-
ment to an interview with Horowitz on the 700 Club, Pat Robertson called 
professors
termites that have worked their way into our academic society, and it’s 
APPALLING. . . . They are racists, murderers, sexual deviants and sup-
porters of Al-Qaeda—and they could be teaching your kids! . . . These 
guys are out and out communists, they are radicals, they are, you know, 
some of them killers, and they are propagandists of the first order. . . .  
[Y]ou don’t want your child to be brainwashed by these radicals, you just 
don’t want it to happen. Not only brainwashed but beat up, they beat 
these people up, cower them into submission. AGGGHHH!!!!  
  (People, “Pat Robertson”)1
The accusation of racism will no doubt surprise those who are also criti-
cized for teaching antiracist courses. If it were only Robertson raving, the 
incident would not merit mention, and one might think that even Horow-
itz would not stoop this low. In fact, the man who has succeeded in putting 
Academic Bill of Rights legislation on the agenda in numerous states—the 
man whose Los Angeles–based not-for-profit Freedom Center (formerly 
the Center for the Study of Popular Culture) reported $4.56 million in rev-
enue in 2006 (David Horowitz)—concurred with Robertson, denounced 
the academy’s alleged political bias as a bigger scandal than Enron, and es-
timated that fifty thousand to sixty thousand professors support terrorism. 
Horowitz expressed dismay at professors’ supposedly enormous six-figure 
salaries and six-hour work week, and he wanted the audience to know that 
professors in the humanities generally do have salaries on the order of 
$300,000 and work six hours a week, eight months a year. He routinely 
blames professors’ Brobdingnagian salaries for the rise in college costs, 
ignoring such real-world factors as state legislatures that slash funding for 
higher education and, in states such as Colorado, push through taxpayer 
bill-of-rights legislation to forestall future efforts to restore funding. In 
reality, about sixty-five percent of the nation’s higher education faculty 
members are now contingent or part-time and may cobble together as 
many as twelve courses a year to earn a livable income, the equivalent of 
teaching a full course’s worth of material every month. By one estimate, 
“median hourly wages for part-time faculty in 2003 range[d] from a low 
of $11.19 at public two-year colleges to a high of $20.24 at private doctoral 




universities” (AAUP, Devaluing 33). The average salary of all disciplines’ 
full professors, a minority in the teaching corps, was $94,738 in 2005–06 
(Survey Report Table 4). Full professors, of course, have spent decades 
studying for the doctorate, competing for jobs, teaching thousands of stu-
dents, and publishing research. As senior members of the profession, they 
naturally earn higher average salaries. But, among them, professors in the 
humanities are not known for earning the highest salaries. In this context, 
it is not hard to guess why Horowitz failed to mention his own 2006 sal-
ary of $509,000 while railing against the salaries of humanities professors 
(David Horowitz).
Academic freedom’s opponents refuse civil discourse itself and, as Mi-
chael Bérubé notes, reject procedural liberalism, too, “the idea that no one 
political faction should control every facet of a society.” What I hope for 
is not a solid, rational critique that will persuade Robertson and Horowitz 
that their goals are double-plus ungood. Instead, I hope for classrooms, 
campuses, and communities full of students who will themselves under-
stand the condescending paternalism of efforts to “protect” them from 
controversy. To convey to students a deep sense of what traditional aca-
demic freedom is and is good for, we need to have a deep sense of what its 
fault lines are.
The Paradox of Academic Freedom
With that goal I turn to what Domna Stanton calls “the paradox of aca-
demic freedom.” We immediately encounter problems clearly presenting 
academic freedom’s value, because academic freedom is, to borrow Michel 
Foucault’s phrase from another context, an “utterly confused category” for 
freedomites and unfreedomites alike (101). Joan Scott and Judith Butler 
have each explored the ways in which disciplinary norms act not only to 
ensure the quality of academic work but also to enforce uniformity. About 
Glenn Morrow’s 1968 definition, Scott writes:
[A]cademic freedom rests on the protection afforded individuals by their 
disciplines against “incompetent outside authorities.” What is ignored is 
the possible conflict between “mutual criticism” and the selection of new 
members “through disciplined and systematic training.” Morrow, like 
Dewey, makes the correction of error, argument about interpretation, 
and the “approval and disapproval” of peers an entirely positive dimen-
sion of scholarly activity. But the inseparable other side of that regula-
tory and enabling authority is that it secures consensus by exclusion. . . .  
[D]iscipline is at once productive—it permits the organization of knowl-
edge and it authorizes knowledge producers—and confining—it installs 




explicit and tacit normative standards which, when they are understood 
to be provisional, can serve important mediating functions, but which, 
when they are taken as dogmatic precepts, become instruments of pun-
ishment. The two aspects cannot be disentangled; discipline functions in 
a necessarily paradoxical way. (169–70)
To this paradox, we can add several more:
the legal question of academic freedom’s status as an individual or institutional 
right, a question introduced in 1957 by the reference in Justice Felix Frank-
furter’s concurring opinion to “ ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to 
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, 
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study” (Sweezy 263; em-
phasis added);
the curious United States arrangement of trustees being, legally, the institution 
itself, which vests academic freedom in persons who may have no academic 
credentials and who may, legally, dismiss faculty members on any grounds or 
none unless otherwise bound by contract or curbed by the First Amendment at 
public institutions;
the supposed conflict between faculty members’ and students’ academic freedom; 
and
the irony that some of the strongest statements in academic freedom’s favor have 
entered the legal lexicon through dissenting opinions, including those of the 
Great Dissenter himself, Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose dissenting opinion in 
Abrams v. United States introduced the notion of a marketplace of ideas as the 
best test of truth.
Other contradictions, ironies, and paradoxes could be extracted from aca-
demic freedom’s messy history in academe, scholarly associations, and the 
courts, in the United States and abroad. These internal fissures threaten 
to undermine academic freedom in a time when adjunct labor without the 
protection of tenure constitutes an increasing percentage of the faculty 
(Laurence; AAUP, Contingent), when funding for higher education is in-
creasingly privatized (Doumani, “Between Coercion”; Frydl; “Report of 
the ADE Ad Hoc Committee”), and when state and federal officials invoke 
terrorism to abridge constitutionally guaranteed civil rights. (On legal 
definitions of academic freedom, see Byrne; Van Alstyne.)
I stress these conditions—reliance on adjunct labor, privatization of 
higher education, and post-9/11 state surveillance—because in this article 
I can only address one brief point about each.
1. The AAUP has long defined academic freedom hand-in-glove with tenure, a 
protection against illegitimate dismissal. The public, notes Richard Mulcahy, 
is today suspicious of this “job security,” and we cannot count on support for it 
without a major enlightenment campaign (156). To the extent that the tenure-




stream faculty, bribed by lower teaching loads or exclusively upper-division and 
graduate courses, is complicit in allowing adjunct labor to become the norm in 
higher education, tenure and academic freedom with it will have been elimi-
nated, not with a bang but with the whimper of underemployed PhDs.
2. Kathleen Frydl argues, “Privatization is the most far-reaching answer to the crit-
ical challenge posed by the research university: who shall exercise sovereignty 
over it, and by what logic? This—and not speech outside the classroom—is the 
front line of academic freedom” (179). She predicts that “the future of academic 
freedom will be not in the courts but in budgets” (195).
3. Post-9/11 abridgments of civil rights and cutbacks in funding certain subjects 
threaten to chill or starve research, notably area studies. Beshara Doumani’s 
Academic Freedom after September 11 includes several essays that ask trenchant 
and disquieting questions about research in such an atmosphere of state sur-
veillance (Doumani, “Between Coercion”; Butler; Newhall; Beinin). Librarians 
vigorously resisted such surveillance. As a result, an outlandish smear campaign 
accused them of supporting terrorism (Ballon; Kaplan; Walfield). An anecdote 
of particular hilarity involved the Patriot Act’s provision that libraries might be 
required to secretly hand over patron records. Consequently, some librarians 
chose to post signs that were legal under the letter if not the spirit of the law, 
such as one that said in large type “The FBI has not been here” and in small 
type “[watch very closely for the removal of this sign]” (Talbot; FBI).
We find none of this levity in Robert Post’s stern analysis of the faculty’s 
lackadaisical defense and understanding of academic freedom. Post fears 
that
[t]he triumph of the [AAUP’s] “1915 Declaration” has been so complete 
that we have grown soft and complacent. We have come all too easily to 
assume academic freedom as our “God-given right” and have become 
oblivious to its distinct justifications and limitations. We have lost touch 
with the many ways in which the academic freedom we . . . enjoy is rooted 
in progressive-era ideas about the function of the university, the role of 
professional expertise and self-regulation, and the preconditions for the 
production of knowledge. (88)
We no longer live in the progressive era, Post reminds us, and we can-
not afford to forget it. In this respect, John Dewey’s 1902 essay “Academic 
Freedom” poses useful historical cautions as well as possible keys to our 
current situation. Dewey confidently assures us, “The university function 
is the truth-function” (55). What this meant for Dewey surely is not what 
academics might take it to mean today. We rely less than Dewey on a no-
tion of science as inevitable progress toward absolute certainty, in which 
some fields are said to be emerging, partial sciences that will eventually 
achieve the unquestionable certainty of “mathematics, astronomy, physics, 
or chemistry,” against which “there is no leverage . . . to direct an attack 




upon academic freedom” (55–56). Bear in mind that Dewey wrote this 
in 1902. Anyone familiar with the course of physics since 1905, in even a 
superficial lay capacity, will find this statement extraordinary, and the dif-
ference that it marks from today is one instance of the very difference to 
which Post refers. Nor did Dewey’s prediction prove accurate that biology 
would quickly free itself from the opposition of anti-Darwinist supersti-
tion, which nowadays goose-steps under the banner of intelligent design.
When the pursuit of truth and knowledge is no longer understood as 
an inevitable approach to absolute certainty, the concept and foundation 
of academic freedom must change. It must become not only more com-
plex but also paradoxical. (This is not, as Gertrude Himmelfarb foolishly 
suggests, to deny “that there is any such thing as knowledge, truth, reason, 
or objectivity” [97].) To what authority does academic freedom appeal, if 
not to that of “definitive method” and “verified fact” (Dewey 56)? Post 
describes the kind of bind that the situation places us in:
Professional norms are needed to constrain the exercise of academic 
freedom so as to connect that freedom to the production of knowledge, 
and yet professional norms are also themselves forms of knowledge that 
are best advanced when debated with the kind of dissent that requires 
academic freedom. Academic freedom thus appears to be simultaneously 
limited by and independent of professional norms. (75)
Worse, professional judgment itself is amenable to enduring difference of 
opinion (even in physics), exposing it to “suspicion and distrust” (Post 77). 
Academic freedom’s opponents exploit this weakness for all it’s worth: con-
temporary academics are all politicized relativists who have no standards, 
they declare; “academic freedom” (still in Buckley’s 1951 scare quotes) is 
merely a screen behind which professors do as they please in the class-
room, unconstrained by fidelity to rigorous standards of truth.
A redoubtable defendant of academic freedom, Post is acutely aware 
of the danger involved in allowing such ideas to flourish, and he believes 
them to be nourished by popular and legal understandings of academic 
freedom as an individual right derivative of, or “a special concern of,” the 
First Amendment, as certain key judicial decisions suggest (Keyishian 
603). Despite these prominent legal rulings and popular understandings of 
academic freedom as inhering in individual professors, Post observes that 
“no university currently deals with its faculty as if academic freedom were 
an individual right”; instead, faculty members are subject to disciplinary 
review (78). At every stage in scholars’ careers, their practices—including 
teaching and student learning—are subject to “a normative account of the 
kind and nature of relevant professional knowledge.” In Post’s view, the 




necessity of a professional judgment of relevance “strongly suggests that 
the distinction between education and indoctrination is largely internal to 
academic standards” and that it must therefore remain a corporate respon-
sibility of the faculty, not the purview of an individual (81). Post is not in-
novating here. “The university would have a certain autonomy (since only 
scholars can pass judgment on scholars as such),” wrote Kant in 1794, “and 
accordingly it would be authorized to perform certain functions through its 
faculties” (Conflict 23; emphasis modified).
This corporate responsibility can provide powerful protection to fac-
ulty members who undertake controversial work, as scholars had already 
discovered in the medieval European university (Hofstadter 3–11). On the 
other hand, such responsibility might also be construed, Scott reminds us, 
to imply “that in order to protect the autonomy of the teaching establish-
ment from ‘outside’ interference, it had to clean its own house by purging 
politically suspect teachers. On this definition, the greater good of the pro-
fession required the sacrifice of its most unconventional or troublesome 
members” (164). This is precisely what activist groups like ACTA hope to 
instill in faculty members: a sense that they must, if they wish to protect 
their freedom, rid the academy of those who attract unwanted attention. In 
this vein, the “Report of the Investigative Committee” on Ward Churchill 
wrote that “public figures who choose to speak out on controversial mat-
ters of public concern naturally attract more controversy and attention 
to their background and work than scholars quietly writing about more 
esoteric matters that are not the subject of political debate” (4). In say-
ing so, the committee meant to answer Churchill’s allegation that he was 
being inappropriately targeted, but the mere fact that controversy does 
attract attention does not mean that controversy does not attract reprisal. 
The principle of academic freedom protects against reprisal (the subject of 
Churchill’s claim), not against heightened scrutiny (the subject of the com-
mittee’s response). I have no position on the committee’s recommenda-
tions or the quality of Churchill’s scholarship; however, I do find the com-
mittee’s cautionary note on attracting controversy discomforting. It is easy 
to discern in it the possible message that unpopular scholarship or public 
speech is undertaken at the individual scholar’s risk without benefit of the 
corporate faculty’s protection. There is advantage here in Post’s corporate-
traditionalist (rather than individualist–First Amendment) argument for 
understanding and protecting academic freedom.
Churchill’s case also raises the tortuous question of intramural ver-
sus extramural speech. Advocacy groups such as ACTA and Horowitz’s 
Freedom Center most commonly state objections to professors’ influence 
over students in the classroom—intramural speech that has typically been 




constrained only by consideration of students’ maturity (AAUP, “General 
Report” 35), the professor’s expertise, and the material’s relevance to course 
work. By contrast, extramural speech has traditionally had weaker protec-
tion and in Kant’s view carried no protection whatsoever. Tellingly, ACTA 
and Horowitz are actually more likely to quote professors’ so-called ex-
tramural speech than their intramural speech. Now, I take popular faculty 
opinion to be that academic freedom ensures faculty members the right 
to express whatever controversial notion comes into their heads, inside 
or outside the classroom, regardless of how tenuous or tendentious the 
notion might be. But in reality academic freedom affords faculty mem-
bers, in Post’s words, “less liberty than that enjoyed by ordinary citizens” 
in expressing opinions publicly because of the obligations their profes-
sion imposes on them to be circumspect, accurate, respectful, and so on, 
obligations the lay citizen does not bear (85). At state institutions, faculty 
members nevertheless have—over and above the protection of academic 
freedom—the full protection of the First Amendment from administrative 
reprisal against extramural speech. However, faculty members at private 
institutions do not have First Amendment protection against adminis-
trative reprisal—a distinction too often forgotten and one that seriously 
throws into disarray recourse to the First Amendment as a basis for aca-
demic freedom, unless we are willing to say that faculty members at pri-
vate institutions have no claim to it or have only a metaphorical claim 
to it. Moreover, Derrida reminds us in “The University without Condi-
tion” that the “transformation under way in public cyberspace, which is 
public on a worldwide scale, beyond state-national frontiers” makes the 
intramural-extramural distinction “more archaic and imaginary than ever” 
(220). In any event, the AAUP’s 1940 statement dropped a 1925 clause re-
quiring a committee to evaluate “doubtful extramural utterances” because 
it was impossible to enforce (Metzger, Age 490), and the 1940 statement 
is generally cagey on the question of extramural speech, committing it-
self to very little. Although an adherence to something like an intramural- 
extramural distinction comes down to us from Kant, we can only conclude 
with Derrida that the distinction “has never been . . . either tenable or 
respectable, in fact or by law” (“University” 220). It may be that this wall’s 
effective absence means that professors are professionally accountable for 
their speech in most circumstances.
Academic freedom, then, should be understood in terms of the corpo-
rate faculty’s right and in terms of a professional expertise that is as care-
fully delimited as possible. Examining actual university practices shows 
immediately that the academy locates the authority that bestows the right 
of academic freedom in a complex network of disciplinary apparatuses. 




These extend from graduate admissions committees through course work, 
teaching assistants’ training, comprehensive exams, professionalization ac-
tivities, the dissertation, conference presentations, peer review for publica-
tion, job interviews, tenure reviews, book reviews, promotion procedures, 
annual reviews, student evaluations, and service on professional commit-
tees and in regional, national, and international associations. Where any 
one of these controls has weakened, institutions are well advised to redress 
the weakness to maintain their credibility and accountability. The system 
is far from perfect, but it does include an extensive battery of controls to 
enforce the norms of academic inquiry on individuals at the same time that 
it lends them a special autonomy: it imposes duties in exchange for rights. 
Indeed, Thomas L. Haskell suggests that professors’ work is subjected to 
“competition more severe than would be thought acceptable in ordinary 
human communities,” not “sheltered” as academic freedom’s detractors 
suggest (47). The basic unit in this competitive system is the department, 
which is in turn an imprecise administrative embodiment of the more ab-
stract discipline, to which faculty members answer in principle. “Academic 
freedom, as it is now structured,” argues Louis Menand,
depends crucially on the autonomy and integrity of the disciplines. For it 
is the departments, and the disciplines to which they belong, that consti-
tute the spaces in which rival scholarly and pedagogical positions are ne-
gotiated. Academic freedom not only protects sociology professors from 
the interference of trustees and public officials in the exercise of their 
jobs as teachers and scholars; it protects them from physics professors  
as well. (“Limits” 17)
If the disciplines’ autonomy and integrity safeguard the duties and rights 
of academic freedom, then what do we make of the academy’s commitment 
to interdisciplinary study, which is nowadays trumpeted on every possible 
occasion? Are we in a pickle if interdisciplinarity is the future of the uni-
versity at the same time that the future of academic freedom depends on 
the autonomy and integrity of the disciplines? There are two points to be 
made here. The first is that interdisciplinarity does pose a challenge to 
academic freedom when faculty members’ research and teaching cross dis-
ciplinary lines in ways that set their methodology at odds with one or more 
of the disciplines that retain the authority to adjudge the merit of that re-
search and teaching. This is not news. Everyone has known for a long time 
that academic judgment in an interdisciplinary context can treacherously 
morph into disciplinary “grudgment.”
The second point is more interesting. Interdisciplinarity raises in espe-
cially salient ways the ever-present question of which academic norms to 




apply in a given instance and how they should be understood to bear on the 
work to be evaluated; in fact, it suggests that the appropriate disciplinary 
norms, as such, do not preexist the work, which takes place in disciplines’ 
interstices. In some forms, interdisciplinarity becomes antidisciplinarity 
and refuses any existing standards of disciplinarity, subjecting these to a 
radically heterodox critique. Assuming rigorous standards, such “radical 
heterodoxy” is exactly what academic freedom should protect (Van Alstyne 
123), but how are we to judge the rigor of the standards when the critique 
takes place outside existing norms, when it refuses what the “autonomy 
and integrity of the disciplines” admit as norms? Before answering that 
question, I want to allow space for Menand’s caveat:
Administrators faced with allocating dwindling resources in the period 
of retrenchment that now seems upon the American university will be 
delighted to see the disciplines lose their authority, for it means spread-
ing fewer faculty farther, and it gives them far greater control over the 
creation and elimination of staff positions. (“Limits” 18)
Or, he asks:
Why support separate medievalists in your history department, your 
English department, your French department, and your art history de-
partment, none of them probably attracting huge enrollments, when you 
can hire one interdisciplinary super-medievalist and install her in a Me-
dieval Studies program, whose survival can be made to depend on its 
ability to attract outside funding? (“Marketplace”)
As Menand understands it, academic freedom’s ability to shelter heterodox 
interdisciplinarity can grant an orthodoxy to the administrative disman-
tling of the humanities.
Menand points to a very real danger, but it is not the whole story. As 
Butler writes, “To question existing norms is not the same as questioning 
the existence of norms in general or calling for a postnormative mode 
of academic inquiry” (114). To admit contingency or challenge disciplin-
ary authority is not to dispense with disciplinary authority any more than 
deconstructing truth is doing away with it. We have seen that even when 
attacks on academic freedom such as ACTA’s aim at individuals—Ward 
Churchill being the poster boy par excellence—they aim beyond them at 
the faculty and not only at the faculty of the individuals’ interdisciplinary 
programs but at the humanities and social science faculties as a whole, not 
only at the University of Colorado but at all United States institutions, 
public and private. Even while admitting that Churchill is anomalous in 
sundry ways, they assert him as the norm. In The Professors: The 101 Most 




Dangerous Academics in America, a book that Cary Nelson exhorts us to 
ignore, Horowitz admits that “it is a reasonable assumption that a majority 
of faculty members are professionals and devoted to traditional academic 
methods and pursuits” (xxvii); nonetheless, he argues that a cherry-picked 
handful of professors is representative of the nation’s faculty as a whole 
and explicitly attributes the influence that they have to the fact that many 
of them teach in interdisciplinary areas. “Because activists ensconced in 
programmatic fields like black studies and women’s studies also teach 
in traditional departments like history and English,” Horowitz believes 
their influence in the academy is dramatically enhanced (xxv). In effect, 
they are synonymous with the faculty at large even if they are anomalous, 
since they have metastasized throughout the faculty body through the 
malignant agency of interdisciplinarity. In this strange view, which ACTA 
shares, Ward Churchill’s work is exceptional but also the very model of a 
postmodern major in general.
Jingoism and opposition to academic freedom did not begin on Sep-
tember 11, 2001. They did gain new footholds then, however, and have 
since taken more precise aim at the humanities and social sciences—and at 
ethnic and area studies in particular, two interdisciplinary fields of special 
interest to many of us in the modern languages. Many hotheaded people 
said many intemperate things following 9/11, but only Churchill acquired 
nationwide iconic status among those seeking to stymie controversial aca-
demic work. I attribute Churchill’s iconicity to his interdisciplinary loca-
tion in ethnic studies, his own disputed ethnicity, and long-standing offi-
cial repression of Native American history. (Again, the issue of Churchill’s 
sketchy scholarship is immaterial here, except insofar as its alleged 
weakness may have delighted those who exploited it for controversy.) It 
is unfortunate but not surprising that after 9/11, in Paul Gilroy’s words, 
“[x]enophobia and nationalism are thriving” (2). Colliding with the power- 
ful antiracist critiques of the past centuries, the new xenophobia and nation-
alism give rise to what Gilroy calls “complex, proteophobic, and ambiva-
lent patterns” of human valuation and devaluation (37). It is easy to see how 
explosive a figure Churchill is when we consider, as Gilroy asks us to, that
wherever they were applied, the colonial techniques of indiscriminate 
mass destruction ended up being closer to the work of extermination than 
control and settlement. In this bloody sequence, the doctrine of preemp-
tive strikes and the systematic refusal to distinguish combatants from ci-
vilians have acquired an elaborate and multinational prehistory. (47)
These are hard truths to confront, and Gilroy names the inability or re-
fusal to come to terms with them “postcolonial melancholia.” His analysis 




of the sort of ethnic reprisals that have followed 9/11 provides an uncanny 
diagnosis of the particular focus of current attacks in the United States 
on ethnic studies. Because academic freedom is authorized by the con-
tingent norms of the disciplines, not individual professors, its opponents 
must direct an attack not only at individuals but also through and beyond 
them at higher education as a whole. Interdisciplinary work epitomizes 
the corporate faculty’s responsibility for academic freedom precisely be-
cause it transcends the boundaries of the traditional units of disciplinary 
authority. Meanwhile, “proteophobic” post-9/11 ethnic animosity fuels jin-
goism. In this way, interdisciplinary programs in ethnic studies afford self-
proclaimed patriots like ACTA and Horowitz a privileged location from 
which to attack the credibility of the corporate faculty.
But the attack typified by How Many Ward Churchills? is only the 
bottom-up prong of the assault on academic freedom. As noted earlier, its 
opponents are also plotting top-down thrusts. David Rabban warns, “An-
other terrorist attack on the United States . . . could easily increase pres-
sures on academic and political expression that have mostly been resisted” 
(xiii). To this danger, we should add that of another economic downturn, 
since, as Frydl argues, financial interests will increasingly determine the 
future of academic freedom. Whereas attempts to dictate directly to in-
dividual faculty members have “mostly been resisted,” top-down efforts 
like ACTA’s to influence governors, trustees, and wealthy alumni donors 
have been at least partially successful because they primarily take aim not 
at faculty governance or specific classrooms but at the folks who hold the 
purse strings, with which they can strangle anyone they care to. For his 
part, Derrida urged us to consider that, to the extent that the university 
undertakes its work “absolutely independent” of economic interest, it “is 
also an exposed, tendered citadel, to be taken, often destined to capitulate 
without condition, to surrender unconditionally” (“University” 206). He 
posed the paradox as a question: how can the faculty claim unconditional 
sovereignty over its work, divorced from economic interest, and not expect 
that work “to let itself be taken over and bought at any price”? To pose his 
question more crassly, how can the university faculty defend its intellectual 
sovereignty, which needs funding, over and against what Buckley named, 
decades ago, the “sovereignty of the consumer”?
One answer is of course that under the logic of late capitalism noth-
ing, including the principle of academic freedom, remains unpenetrated by 
commodification, that everything will only be ever more thoroughly com-
modified, and that in a postindustrial information economy, intellectual 
work is the premier commodity, not the one form of work preserved from 
commercial contamination. This would be an immobilizing conclusion if it 




were all there is left to say, but Derrida’s purpose in “The University with-
out Condition” is to marshal an “unconditional resistance” from within 
the humanities “to all the powers of dogmatic and unjust appropriation . . . 
to all the powers that limit democracy to come” (204–05). The humanities 
are the privileged space of academic freedom’s defense and definition pre-
cisely because the truth as such has been most vigorously debated in the 
humanities. If academic freedom protects the right to the pursuit of truth 
and knowledge, it is in the humanities that we learn what we are pursuing. 
And to the extent that language is the ground of the human figure, the 
field of language and literature is the epicenter of the humanities. (Think 
of Diderot’s Rêve de d’Alembert in which Cardinal de Polignac exclaims to 
an orangutan in a glass cage, “Speak! And I will baptize you”—an anecdote 
that is no longer so farfetched as Mlle de Lespinasse must have thought it 
[675; my trans.].)
To shoulder “truth” and “the human” is a tall order and one that de-
mands disciplinary flexibility in the humanities and the freedom to range 
into the social sciences, law, the natural sciences, theology, and medicine. 
It demands the very free range that Kant claims for philosophy in The Con-
flict of the Faculties, where he offers a definition of philosophy that sounds 
a lot like the humanities at large: “a science of man, of his representations, 
thoughts and actions” (127). In this vein, we might pastiche Derrida: “there 
is no outside-the-humanities” (“Il n’y a pas de hors-texte” [De la grammatolo-
gie 227]). The pastiche may seem flippant, but in the age of genocide and 
terrorism the notion that nothing human could be alien to us as humanists 
in the world’s sole superpower could not be more relevant. This relevance 
is exactly what many in the humanities have wanted to engage when they 
have been accused of impertinent politicking in the classroom: to ask if 
language can be more adequate to the truth; to ask if history has been 
recounted truthfully; to discern the alien as human; to learn the language 
and culture of the other; to explore the history of the inhuman/e in the 
human/e; to demand an expansion of human rights; to interrogate the bor-
der rather than the human being at the border; to discover what rhetorics 
of language and image mobilize a border around who counts as human; to 
question who is patrolling the border and with what ends. These questions 
can only be impious.
note   | /
1. I learned of this spine-tingling outburst in Henry Giroux’s article. In the body of 
my essay, I have quoted the version of the interview transcript posted on People for the 
American Way’s Web site, where a video clip is also available (“700”). There is a tamer 




transcript of the interview on the CBN News Web site (CBN News). The video clip 
appears to be a segment introductory to the interview itself. Both Giroux’s transcript 
and that of People for the American Way appear to be of the introductory segment, 
not the interview itself; however, Giroux cites as his reference the tamer CBN News 
transcript of the interview itself.
workS citeD   | /
Adorno, Theodor. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. 1959. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. 
Rodney Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001. Print.
American Association of University Professors. AAUP Contingent Faculty Index 2006. 
AAUP, Dec. 2006. Web. 12 Dec. 2006.
———. The Devaluing of Higher Education: The Annual Report on the Economic Status of 
the Profession, 2005–06. AAUP, Mar.-Apr. 2006. Web. 30 Nov. 2006.
———. “General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Ten-
ure [1915 Report].” Metzger, American Concept 16–43.
American Council of Trustees and Alumni. “Alumni Organize to Preserve Free Speech 
and Free Thought at Colleges and Universities.” ACTA, 17 Mar. 1995. Web. 12 Dec. 
2006.
———. “Governor’s Project: Reforming Higher Education.” ACTA, n.d. Web. 6 June 
2007.
———. How Many Ward Churchills? ACTA, 2006. Web. 16 Aug. 2006.
———. “Jerry L. Martin.” ACTA, n.d. Web. 1 Oct. 2006.
———. “Mission and History.” ACTA, n.d. Web. 17 Oct. 2006.
Ballon, Marc. “Library Group Draws Fire over Web Site.” Jewish Journal 20 Jan. 2006: 
n. pag. Web. 30 Nov. 2006.
Beinin, Joel. “The New McCarthyism: Policing Thought about the Middle East.” 
Doumani, Academic Freedom 237–66.
Bérubé, Michael. “What Does ‘Academic Freedom’ Mean?” Academe Nov.-Dec. 2006: 
n. pag. Web. 23 Sept 2008.
Buckley, William F. God and Man at Yale: The Superstitions of “Academic Freedom.” Chi-
cago: Regnery, 1951. Print.
Butler, Judith. “Academic Norms, Contemporary Challenges: A Reply to Robert Post 
on Academic Freedom.” Doumani, Academic Freedom 107–42.
Byrne, Peter J. “Academic Freedom: A ‘Special Concern of the First Amendment.’ ” Yale 
Law Journal 99.2 (1989): 251–40. Print.
Campbell, Bob. “State Education Commission Coming under Fire.” Colorado Springs 
Independent 24 May 2001: n. pag. Web. 28 Sept. 2006.
CBN News. “The 101 Most Dangerous Professors in America.” CBN, n.d. Web. 4 Oct. 
2006.
Chamberlain, John. Introduction. Buckley n. pag.
Cronin, Mike. “Conservatives Push to Counter Liberal Professors.” Arizona Republic 
12 Aug. 2006: n. pag. Web. 18 Oct. 2006.
David Horowitz Freedom Center. 2006 Form 990. GuideStar. GuideStar, n.d. Web. 23 
Sept. 2008.
Derrida, Jacques. De la grammatologie. Paris: Minuit, 1967. Print.
———. Du droit à la philosophie. Paris: Galilée, 1990. Print.




———. “The University without Condition.” Without Alibi. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Stan-
ford: Stanford UP, 2002. 202–37. Print. Trans. of L’université sans condition. Paris: 
Galilée, 2001.
Dewey, John. “Academic Freedom.” 1902–1903. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois UP, 1976. 53–66. Print. Vol. 2 of The Middle Works, 1899–1924. 
15 vols. 1976–83.
Diderot, Denis. Le rêve de d’Alembert. Philosophie. Paris: Laffont, 1994. 601–86. Print. 
Vol. 1 of Œuvres.
Doumani, Beshara, ed. Academic Freedom after September 11. New York: Zone, 2006. 
Print.
———. “Between Coercion and Privatization.” Doumani, Academic Freedom 11–57.
Fain, Paul. “Surveys Find Governing Boards Are Older and Slightly More Diverse.” 
Chronicle of Higher Education 1 July 2005: A21. Print.
FBI Sign. N.p., n.d. Web. 9 Oct. 2006. 
Florida Department of Education. “Jerry L. Martin.” Florida Dept. of Educ., n.d. Web. 
1 Oct. 2006.
Foucault, Michel. An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage, 1978. 
Print. Vol. 1 of The History of Sexuality.
Frydl, Kathleen J. “Trust to the Public: Academic Freedom in the Multiversity.” Dou-
mani, Academic Freedom 175–202.
Gerstmann, Evan, and Matthew J. Streb, eds. Academic Freedom at the Dawn of a New 
Century: How Terrorism, Governments, and Culture Wars Impact Free Speech. Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2006. Print.
Gilroy, Paul. Postcolonial Melancholia. New York: Columbia UP, 2005. Print.
Giroux, Henry A. “Academic Freedom under Fire: The Case for Critical Pedagogy.” 
College English 33.4 (2006): 1–42. Print.
Global Colloquium of University Presidents. “Statement on Academic Freedom.” Co-
lumbia U, 26 May 2005. Web. 23 Dec. 2006.
Haskell, Thomas L. “Justifying the Rights of Academic Freedom in the Era of ‘Power/ 
Knowledge.’ ” Menand, Future 43–90.
Himmelfarb, Gertrude. “The New Advocacy and the Old.” Spacks 96–101.
Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of the College. Hofstadter and Metzger 1–274.
Hofstadter, Richard, and Walter P. Metzger. The Development of Academic Freedom in the 
United States. New York: Columbia UP, 1955. Print.
Horowitz, David. The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in America. Washing-
ton: Regnery, 2006. Print.
Kant, Immanuel. “An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?’ ” Political 
Writings. Ed. Hans Reiss. Trans. H. B. Nisbet. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1991. 54–60. Print.
———. The Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit der Facultä ten). Trans. Mary J. Gregor. 
Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1979. Print.
Kaplan, Lee. “Librarians for Terror.” Front Page Magazine 24 Aug. 2004: n. pag. Web. 
30 Nov. 2006.
“Keyishian et al. v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York.” 1967. 
Metzger, Constitutional Status 589–629.
Laurence, David. “The Demography of the Faculty, 1993–2004.” ADE Bulletin 138-139 
(2005–06): 3–14. Print.




Lederman, Doug. “Stacking the Deck?” Inside Higher Ed 1 May 2007: n. pag. Web. 
8 May 2007.
Lieberman, Joe. “Letter to ACTA.” Nation 17 Jan. 2002: n. pag. Web. 17 Oct. 2006.
Martin, Jerry L., and Anne D. Neal. Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are 
Failing America and What Can Be Done about It. Rev. ed. ACTA, Feb. 2002. Web. 
30 Nov. 2006.
Martin, Jerry L., Anne D. Neal, and Michael S. Nadel. The Shakespeare File: What 
English Majors Are Really Studying. ACTA, Dec. 1996. Web. 30 Nov. 2006.
McAllister, Bill. “Friends in High Places Should Benefit Ex-CU Professor.” Denver Post 
6 Sept. 2000: F1. Print.
Menand, Louis, ed. The Future of Academic Freedom. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996. 
Print.
———. “The Limits of Academic Freedom.” Menand, Future 3–20.
———. “The Marketplace of Ideas.” American Council of Learned Societies. Occasional 
Paper 49. ACLS, 2001. Web. 10 Oct. 2006.
Metzger, Walter P. The Age of the University. Hofstadter and Metzger 275–506.
———, ed. The American Concept of Academic Freedom: A Collection of Essays and Reports. 
New York: Arno, 1977. Print.
———, ed. The Constitutional Status of Academic Freedom. New York: Arno, 1977. 
Print.
Morrison, Toni. Nobel lecture. Nobelprize.org. Nobel Foundation, 7 Dec. 1993. Web. 
21 Oct. 2006.
Mulcahy, Richard. “A Full Circle: Advocacy and Academic Freedom in Crisis.” Spacks 
142–60.
Nelson, Cary. “Ignore This Book.” Rev. of The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Aca-
demics in America, by David Horowitz. Academe Nov .-Dec. 2006: 81–85. Print.
Newhall, Amy. “The Unraveling of the Devil’s Bargain: The History and Politics of 
Language Acquisition.” Doumani, Academic Freedom 203–36.
Pavela, Gary. “Academic Freedom for Students Has Ancient Roots.” Chronicle of Higher 
Education 27 May 2005: B8. Print.
People for the American Way. Buying a Movement: Right Wing Foundations and American 
Politics. PFAW, 1996. Web. 1 Oct. 2006.
———. “Pat Robertson Calls Liberal Professors ‘Racists, Murderers, Sexual Deviants 
and Supporters of Al-Qaeda.’ ” PFAW, 21 Mar. 2006. Web. 4 Oct. 2006.
———. “700 Club’s Pat Robertson Comments on Liberal Professors.” PFAW, 21 Mar. 
2006. Web. 4 Oct. 2006.
Pérez, Emma. “Ward Churchill Is Neocon Test Case for Academic Purges.” WBAI. 
WBAI, 15 Feb. 2005. Web. 1 Oct. 2006.
Post, Robert. “The Structure of Academic Freedom.” Doumani, Academic Freedom 
61–106.
Rabban, David. Foreword. Gerstmann and Streb ix–xiv.
“Report of the ADE Ad Hoc Committee on Changes in the Structure and Financing 
of Higher Education.” ADE Bulletin 137 (2005): 89–102. Print.
“Report of the Investigative Committee of the Standing Committee on Research Mis-
conduct at the University of Colorado at Boulder concerning Allegations of Aca-
demic Misconduct against Professor Ward Churchill.” U of Colorado, 16 May 2006. 
Web. 9 Oct. 2006.
Scott, Joan. “Academic Freedom as an Ethical Practice.” Menand, Future 163–80.




Spacks, Patricia Meyer, ed. Advocacy in the Classroom: Problems and Possibilities. New 
York: St. Martin’s, 1996. Print.
Stanton, Domna. “The Paradox of Academic Freedom.” MLA Newsletter 37.3 (2005): 
3–5. Print.
Survey Report Table 4. American Association of University Professors. AAUP, n.d. Web. 
30 Nov. 2006.
“Sweezy v. New Hampshire.” Metzger, Constitutional Status 234–70.
Talbot, Margaret. “Subversive Reading.” New York Times 28 Sept. 2003: n. pag. Web. 
23 Aug. 2006.
“Time Is of the Essence.” Chronicle of Higher Education 6 Oct. 2006: A25. Print.
Van Alstyne, William W. “Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the 
Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review.” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 53.3 (1990): 79–154. Print.
Walfield, Mike. “The ALA Library: Terrorist Sanctuary.” Front Page Magazine 8 May 
2003: n. pag. Web. 30 Nov. 2006.
Wilson, Robin. “A Not-So-Professorial Watchdog: Anne Neal Has Never Worked at 
a College, but She Has Become a Leading Critic of Left-Wing Faculty Members.” 
Chronicle of Higher Education 10 Nov. 2006: A10. Print.
